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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATB OP U'l'AB
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CREDIT
CORPORATION 1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16250

PIONEER TRACTOR & IMPLEMENT,
INC., WAYNE A. SCHOENFELD
and DORA C. SCHOENFELD,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was filed by International Harvester
Credit Corporation to recover amounts due from Pioneer
Tractor and Implement, Inc., a former International Harvester
dealer, and from the two owners of the business who personally guaranteed the obligations of the corporate defendant
to the Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable
J. Robert Bullock, District Judge presiding.

At the

conclusion of the trial the Court asked the parties to
submit memoranda summarizing their respective positions and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dealing with certain issues which had arisen during the
course of the trial.

Thereafter the Court prepared a

Decision and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment which are generally favorable to the
position of the Plaintiff.

A motion to amend or, in the

alternative, for a new trial was filed, considered and
denied and, in due course, a notice of appeal was filed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment
entered by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in the

Appellan~'

brief is confusing and somewhat misleading and thus the
Respondent feels an obligation to state the facts as it
finds them.
On December 1, 1975, an Agreement (Exhibit 1) was
entered into between International Harvester Company
(hereinafter "IHC") and Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc.
(hereinafter "Pioneer") establishing Pioneer as an International Harvester Farm Equipment Dealer.

In connection

with the establishment of the dealership, additional agreements were entered into providing for various kinds of
financing by International Harvester Credit Corporation
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Exhibits 2 and 3) and for a personal guarantee of the
obligations of the corporate dealer by Wayne A. Schoenfeld
and Dora C. Schoenfeld (Exhibits 4 and 5).
International Harvester Credit Corporation
(hereinafter "IHCC") offered and Pioneer made use of several
different kinds of financing assistance, including:
1.

Floor plan financing for new and used vehicles.
Pioneer was required to sign wholesale notes
covering the separate pieces of equipment and
each month it received a Wholesale Note and
Inventory Statement summarizing the status of
the various notes (R. 180, 181).

Notes

covering specific pieces of equipment became
due when the items were "resold, leased or
placed in use" (Exhibit 1, §11).
2.

Open account financing on routine transactions
with IHC.

Parts purchases, interest charges,

freight costs, warranty credits and other
such transactions between IHC and Pioneer were
handled through an open account (R. 181, 182,
212, 213).

Once a month the balance in the

open account was purchased by IHCC from IHC
and Pioneer was then given until the 15th of
the following month to pay the open account
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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balance (R. 182, 183).
3.

Purchasing of retail contracts on sales made
by Pioneer.

"Exhibit E", which is part of

Exhibit 2, sets forth the agreement of the
parties with respect to such purchases and
provides for the establishment of a reserve
account to be held by IHCC during the period
that retail contracts are being financed.
Pioneer operated for a fairly short time as an
International Harvester dealer.

Early in August of 1976

representatives of IHC were notified verbally (R. 257) and

ir

writing (Exhibit 6) of the intention of the dealer to
resign.

The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Exhibit 1)

contains very specific provisions (§29) dealing with the
termination of a dealer and the outlined procedures were
thereafter followed by IHC and IHCC in disposing of the part
and farm equipment inventory of Pioneer.

Representatives

of Pioneer were consulted and kept informed as the parts
and equipment were being processed (R. 204, 259-262).
Credits generated by the sale of the parts and
equipment inventory to other dealers and, where this was
not possible, back to IHC, were applied to the various
obligations of Pioneer to IHCC (R. 211) and this action was
initiated to recover the remaining balance.
-4-
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Delbert L. Homestead, the District Operations
Manager for IHCC, testified in detail with respect to the
procedure followed after the resignation of Pioneer as an
International Harvester dealer.

In accordance with Rule 70(1)

(f) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, he was also permitted
to summarize the numerous bookkeeping entries and accounts
and testify as to the amount owing by the Appellants to
IHCC (R. 212-214), including interest (R. 216, 217).

The

Judgment entered by the Court (R. 19) is consistent with
the testimony of Mr. Homestead.
There was conflicting evidence during the course
of the trial with respect to certain charges to the Pioneer
account which were included in the amount claimed by IHCC.
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses and considering
the arguments and memoranda submitted by the parties, the
Trial Court found that the charges to the account were
proper and justified under the circumstances (R. 24) .
The Appellants filed a Counterclaim against IHCC
and a Third Party Claim against IHC contending that they
were misled in connection with the opening of the dealership and the subsequent ordering of inventory.

The Trial

Court concluded that the Appellants had failed to meet
their burden of proving actionable misconduct on the part
of IHCC or IHC (R. 26) and dismissed the Counterclaim and
Third Party Claim (R. 20).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN PERMITTING
THE RESPONDENT'S WITNESS TO SUMMARIZE THE
VOLUMINOUS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER RECORDS
AND STATE HIS CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT
TO THE AMOUNTS OWING BY THE APPELLANTS
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, Delbert L.
Homestead, the Respondent's District Operations Manager,
was permitted to summarize numerous bookkeeping entries and
accounts and testify as to the amount owing by the Appellant:
(R. 212-214).

The Appellants have contended in Point I of

their brief that the Court abused its discretion in allowing
this testimony.
In considering this issue some background information may be helpful.
1977 (R. 144).

This action was filed in October of

In November of 1977 the Respondent answered

the first set of interrogatories

(R. 134) with information

on the handling of the parts inventory following the
termination of the dealership.

Answer No. 1 indicated

that complete records with respect to the parts return were
available at the office of the Respondent's counsel and
that they would be made available for examination or copyin~
at any convenient time.
In December of 1977 a Request for Production of
Documents

(R. 131) was served by the Appellants.

All of
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the documents which had been gathered by the Respondent
in support of its claim were made available to the Appellants
in response to the Request for Production (R. 126).

There-

after the depositions of Noel R. Critchfield, Delbert L.
Homestead and Steven E. Parker were taken (R. 63) and they
were examined with respect to the documents that had been
produced.

No further request for production was served and

no motion for relief was made pursuant to Rule 37 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging a failure to produce
available documents.
At the time of the trial all of the documents
which formed the basis for Mr. Homestead's conclusions
(most of which had been previously copied by the Appellants)
were present in the courtroom and were located upon the
counsel table (R. 288, 292-297).

And, Appellant Wayne

Schoenfeld acknowledged in his testimony that prior to the
initiation of the litigation Mr. Homestead had made the
Respondent's records available to him and that he had gone
through them (R. 321).
These facts clearly distinguish the instant case
from the situation in Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Louis A.
Roser Company, 589 P.2d 756 (Utah, 1978) which is cited by
the Appellants.

There it was held that the trial court

had improperly admitted a summary since the original records
from which the summary had been taken had not been made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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available to the opposing parties and the court.

In the

Gull Laboratories case this Court quoted the following
language from Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 utah
2d 344, 294 P.2d 689

(1956):

"It has been held, and we believe the
ruling to be a salutary and expedient
one, that where original book entries,
documents or other data are so numerous,
complex or cumbersome that they cannot
be conveniently examined by the fact
trier, or where it would materially aid
the court and the parties in analyzing
such material, that a competent person
who has made such examination may
present such evidence. This is subject
to the limitation that the evidence must
be shown to be developed from records,
books, or documents, the competency of
which has been established, the records
must be ava1lable for exam1nation by the
opposing parties, and the witnesses sub'ect to cross-examination concernin such
Emphas1s added.
The question of when and under what circumstances
a summary of numerous documents can be received in evidence
was settled when this Court adopted the Utah Rules of
Evidence in 1971.

Rule 70(1) (b) makes an exception to the

best evidence rule,
. when the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time, and the evidence sought
from them is only the general result of
the whole."
Rule 70(2) provides that,
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"If evidence is to be admitted as
provided in Paragraph (1) (b), the
original shall be made available to the
opponent for examination or copying,
or both, at a reasonable time and placeJ
and the judge may order that the originals
be produced in court.n
This sensible and necessary exception to the beat
evidence rule has long been recognized.

In Wigmore on

Evidence Vol. 14, §1230 (1972 Ed.), Professor Wigmore
points out that where the fact to be determined depends upon
a large volume of documents, it is practically out of the
question to have all of the documents go into evidence and
to have to prove every item therein.
"The convenience of trials demands that
other evidence be allowed to be offered in
the shape of the testimony of a competent
witness who has perused the entire mass and
will state summarily the net result. Such
a practice is well established to be proper.n
In Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2, §7:30 (1972) is the following:
"Another exception to the best evidence
rule, based upon necessity, arises when
the primary source of proof consists of
numerous documents which cannot be conveniently examined in court and the fact
to be proved can only be ascertained by
an examination of the whole collection.
It is well established that in such a case
a summary or the general result of the
examination may be given in evidence by
any person who has examined the documents
and who is skilled in such matters, provided the result is capable of being
ascertained by calculation."
utah cases recognizing this exception to the best
evidence rule go back as far as State v. Olsen, 75 Utah 583,
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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287 Pac. 181 (1930), and include the cases of Nalder v.
Kellogg Sales Company 6 Utah 2d 367, 314 P.2d 350 (1957)
and Shupe v. Menlowe, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246 (1966)
which are cited by the Appellants.

Statutory recognition

of the exception is found in Utah Code Annotated 78-25-16{5)
(1953), which permits evidence of the contents of a writing
other than the writing itself to be received,
"When the original consists of num<:!rous
accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss
of time, and the evidence sought from
them is only the general result of the
whole."
Permitting Mr. Homestead to summarize the voluminous accounting records in this case and testify as to
the amount owing by the Appellants as reflected therein
was completely justifiable under the circumstances:
1.

Mr. Homestead was a responsible representative
of the Respondent (District Operations
Manager, R. 177) and he was thoroughly familiar
with the records involved (R. 180-182, 292,
293).

2.

The records were kept in the regular course
of business and the originals of all of the
monthly statements, invoices and other bookkeeping entries had been furnished to Pioneer
at the time that they were prepared (R. 295-2
-10-
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3.

As documented above, the complete recorda on
which Mr. Homestead's testimony was baaed
had been made available to the Appellants on
various occasions and they were available in
court for use in cross-examination.

As a

matter of fact, counsel for the Appellants
used some of the documents in connection with
his cross-examination (R. 292-297) •
4.

The amounts testified to by Mr. Homestead
were capable of being ascertained by calculation and consisted of the balance of the
obligation after deducting all proper credits
and certain questionable items (R. 211-214).
POINT II

THE AMOUNT OWING TO THE RESPONDENT BASED UPON
FLOORING NOTES WAS PART OF THE TOTAL BALANCE
REFLECTED IN THE VOLUMINOUS RECORDS INVOLVED
IN THE CASE AND THE SUMMARY THEREOF BY RESPONDENT'S
WITNESS WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE
At the time that Pioneer resigned as an IHC dealer,
it had approximately $400,000 worth of farm equipment inventory which was covered by floor plan financing provided by
IHCC (R. 472).

Separate pieces of equipment were covered by

separate wholesale notes and the status of all of the notes
was summarized in a monthly statement sent by IHCC to the
dealer (R. 180, 181).
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Following the resignation of Pioneer, the farm
equipment in the inventory was either sold to other IHC
dealers (R. 205) or was resold to IHC (R. 207).

Pioneer's

account was credited with the freight charges that had been
imposed when Pioneer purchased the equipment (R. 206) and
the amount that Pioneer had paid for the equipment, less,
in some cases, an agreed 3% handling charge (R. 207).
The credits were applied to (1) a check from
Pioneer in the amount of $3,877.27 which would not clear
the bank;

(2) $40,918.29 owing on equipment which had been

sold but not paid for; and (3) to the notes covering the
specific items which were either sold to other dealers or
resold to IHC (R. 211, 212).

After applying all of the

credits the balance owing on the Wholesale Note and Inventory
Statement was $4,311.81 (R. 212).

This amount did not

necessarily relate to specific notes, it was merely a net
balance owing after applying all available credits to the
total flooring obligation (R. 212).
The summary of the transactions and the testimony
of Mr. Homestead on the resulting balance clearly qualifies
under the exception to the best evidence rule which is
discussed in POINT I, above.

The Appellants have contended

in POINT II of their brief that the specific notes on which
the $4,311.81 balance was based should have been ~laced in
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence.

However, the notes were numerous and the traa8-

actions through which they were cancelled were rather
complicated.

In view of the volume of documents involved

the Court properly and prudently permitted Mr. Ba.estead
to summarize the transactions and state the net result.
Inasmuch as both POINTS I and II of the Appellants•
Brief attack decisions made by the Trial Court in admitting
evidence, it is worth reiterating that trial courts have
been held to be entitled to" • • • some reasonable latitude
of discretion" in rulings on the admission or the exclusion
of evidence (In Re Baxter's Estate, 16 Utah 2d 284, 399
P.2d 442 (1965)).

Reversal is appropriate only if a clear

abuse of discretion is shown (Martin v. Safeway Stores,
565 P.2d 1139 (Utah, 1977).
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
DISPUTED CHARGES RELATED TO RETAIL CONTRACTS
PURCHASED BY THE RESPONDENT FROM PIONEER
During the period of the business relationship
between the Respondent and Pioneer, various problems arose
in connection with retail contracts which had been purchased
by the Respondent.

Charges to Pioneer's account as a result

of these problems were the subject of a good deal of
conflicting testimony during the course of the trial.
The Trial Court, after hearing the witness and considering
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the documentary evidence, resolved the questions with respect
to the disputed charges in favor of the Respondent.

Inas-

much as the Trial Court had a chance to hear the witnesses
and observe their demeanor first hand, the finding in favor
of the Respondent should not be disturbed unless it is
clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence (Wilcox v.
Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1 (1936)).
The purchase of retail contracts was one of the
financing services offered to International Harvester
dealers by the Respondent (R. 183).

Contracts covering used

equipment were purchased on a full recourse basis (R. 184)
and contracts covering new equipment were purchased on a
limited recourse basis, with a reserve account being
utilized to absorb losses up to a certain limit in connectioc
with repossessions (R. 183-185).
"Exhibit E", which is a part of Exhibit 2, sets
forth in detail the conditions under which retail contracts
were purchased by the Respondent from Pioneer.

The AppellG:

have taken some portions of this agreement out of context
and have used them in contending that the procedure
followed by the Respondent in handling losses experienced
in connection with retail contracts was not proper.

As a

matter of fact, when viewed in context, the agreement is
clear and consistent and the handling of the retail contrac:
-14-
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losses by the Respondent was in accordance with its terma.
In view of the Appellants' attempt to focus the
Court's attention on isolated portions of the agreement in
question and to find ambiguities where none exist, several
fundamental rules of interpreting contracts are worth
mentioning:
1.

The intention of the parties is not to be
determined from detached portions of the
agreement.

The intention should be ascertained

by reading the agreement as a whole.
(Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club,
13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 928 (1962) and
Thomas J. Peck and Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock
Products, Inc. 30 Utah 2d 187, 616 P.2d 446
(1973)).
2.

The concept of construing language in
a contract most strongly against the party
who used it is the last rule of construction
to be resorted to and is only to be relied on
where other rules of construction fail.
(Simpson on Contracts §67, pp. 252, 253 (1954)) ·
In the case of Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d 440,
354 P.2d 121 (1960), the Court stated:
"We are in agreement with the wellrecognized rule urged by the defendants
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that where there is uncertainty or
ambiguity the contract should be
strictly construed against him who
draws it. But it is to be kept in
mind that this rule applies only where
there is some genuine lack of certainty,
and not to strained or merely fanciful or
wishful interpretations that may be
indulged in. The primary and a more
fundamental rule is that the contract
must be looked at realistically in the
light of the circumstances under which
it was entered into, and if the intent
of the parties can be ascertained with
reasonable certainty it must be given
effect."
With these principles in mind it is appropriate
to review the pertinent provisions of the contract covering
retail financing arrangements ("Exhibit E" to Exhibit 2):
Paragraph A.l. - IHCC agrees to purchase retail contracts
covering new and used equipment.
Paragraph B.2. - The dealer warrants that contracts sold to
IHCC will be free from defenses, offsets
or counterclaims and that the goods covered
thereby have been delivered.
Paragraph B.3. -The dealer agrees to repurchase any contract
with respect to which a warranty has been
breached.
Paragraph B.S. - The dealer consents, among other things,
to compromises made by IHCC with retail
customers.
-16-
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Paragraph B.7. -Contracts covering used equipment are
purchased on a full recourse basis.
Paragraph C.B.(a) -A reserve account is established and
is funded by depositing therein a percentage of the applicable finance charge
collected at the time that the contract
is purchased.

Gains realized on the resale

of repossessed goods are also credited to
the account.

Losses experienced by IHCC

on retail contracts are to be charged to
the account.

While the first sentence of

Paragraph C. B. (a) (iv) does not mention
repossessions, the other two sentences make
it clear that the losses to be charged are
those relating to "repossessed goods".
Paragraph

c. a.

(b) - With respect to contracts purchased on
a limited recourse basis, the amount
charged to the reserve account or which
must be paid by the dealer is limited to
$1,000.

The appellants have contended in POINT III of
their Brief that all losses experienced by IHCC on retail
contracts should have been charged to the reserve account
and limited in amount to $1,000.
-17-
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of the whole agreement in context, discloses that:
1.

Contracts covering used equipment were
purchased on a fully guaranteed basis.

2.

The responsibility to charge the reserve
account and the limitation on liability
relate only to repossessions involving
contracts on new equipment which were
purchased on a limited recourse basis.

Mr. Homestead explained this in his testimony (R. 184, 185)
and the provisions of the contract fully support his
testimony.
With that analysis of the agreement in mind, it
is appropriate to examine the disputed charges relating to
retail contracts to determine whether they were properly
handled.
1.

Myron Jones.

Mr. Jones purchased an Interna-

tional tractor and traded in a Steiger tractor with the under·
standing that an existing obligation covering the Steiger
tractor would be paid by Pioneer and that he would be
relieved of his liability thereon (R. 188, 189, 244).
Pioneer failed to pay off the lien on the Steiger tractor
and eventually Mr. Jones rescinded the transaction by
returning the International tractor and taking his Steiger
tractor back (R. 189, 190).

As a result of the rescission,
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the Pioneer open account was charged with a $2,500 retail
delivery allowance that had been credited to it when the
unit was sold to Mr. Jones and $1,006.86 in interest lost
as a result of the rescission of the retail contract
(R. 190).

These amounts were reduced by a $1,790 credit,

representing money received from Mr. Jones as compensation
for the use of the tractor (R. 189).

The net charge to the

Pioneer account as a result of the rescission was $1,716.86.
There was no obligation to charge this obligation to the Pioneer reserve account or to limit the charge
to $1,000.

The rescission arose out of a defense had by

the customer, contrary to the dealer's warranty that no such
defenses existed, and the charge did not relate to a
repossession.
2.

Duane Taylor.

Mr. Taylor purchased a tractor

from Pioneer and the contract covering the unit was purchased
by IHCC.

When IHCC tried to get Mr. Taylor to make payments

on the contract he contended that the true balance owing
was considerably less than the amount shown on the contract
(R. 191).

In support of this contention Mr. Taylor supplied

a different contract that he claimed was the one that he
had signed and a check reflecting a $2,000 payment which the
contract did not show (R. 192).

Mr. Schoenfeld attempted

to straignten the matter out but he was not successful in
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doing so (R. 192).

After a period of time IHCC concluded

that the circumstances justified entering into a compromise
settlement with Mr. Taylor (R. 192, 193).

Mr. Schoenfeld

was advised of the intention of IHCC to compromise the
matter (R. 193) and, when he failed to object, IHCC agreed
to reduce Mr. Taylor's balance by $2,832.46 {R. 193) and
charged that amount to Pioneer's open account {R. 194).
Charging the amount involved to the open account
was correct because the adjustment was the result of a
defense asserted by the customer and the retail financing
agreement gave IHCC the right to enter into compromises.
No repossession occurred and so the reserve account was not
involved.
3.

William Branch.

The Appellants do not contend

in their Brief that the handling of the Branch transaction
was improper.

They only claim that the evidence did not

support the charge.

However, the matter was fully explained

by Mr. Homestead {R. 194-196, 225, 226, 243).

And, even

though Mr. Schoenfeld took issue with some of the other
charges, he presented no testimony at all on the Branch
transaction.

Thus, the testimony of Mr. Homestead was not

disputed and it stands as the only evidence in the record
on this matter.
-20-
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4.

Garth Sweeten and Sam Kogianes.

In both of

these cases the retail customers claimed the riqht to
receive something in addition to what they had received at
the time that they siqned the contracts which were sold
by Pioneer to IHCC.

Mr. Sweeten had not received a hitch

(R. 196, 197) and Mr. Kogianes had been promised a wider
grain platform (R. 197).

In the case of the Koqianes

problem Mr. Schoenfeld helped to remedy the problem (R. 199),
and small charges were made to the Pioneer open account
($599.03 in the case of the hitch and $431.63, representinq
the cost of installing the new grain platform).
Here again it is apparent that the amounts
involved were properly charged to the open account.

One

of the warranties made by the dealer in the retail financinq
agreement was that the goods covered by assigned contracts
had been delivered.

And, since no repossession occurred,

there was no basis for charging the amounts involved to the
dealer's reserve account.
In short, all of the disputed charges relating
to retail contracts were supported by the evidence and the
procedure followed was consistent with the detailed
provisions of the retail financing agreement.
-21-
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POINT IV
THE 3\ HANDLING CHARGE WHICH WAS IMPOSED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPURCHASE OF FARM
EQUIPMENT BY INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER
WAS PROVIDED FOR BY CONTRACT AND WAS REASONABLE
Following the resignation of Pioneer as an
International Harvester dealer, representatives of both
IHC and IHCC travelled to Spanish Fork to assist in
processing Pioneer's inventory of farm equipment and parts.
As much as possible of the equipment was sold directly to
other IHC dealers (R. 262, 263).

No handling charge was

deducted in connection with these sales and Pioneer's
account was credited for the full amount that had been charge:
to it in connection with the purchase of the equipment,
plus the freight charges that had been imposed (R. 263, 264).
Equipment which could not be sold to other
dealers was repurchased by IHC.

On these purchases Pioneer's

account was again credited with the full cost of the equipment plus freight charges paid, less a 3% "handling charge"
(R. 264, 265).
In their Answer to the Respondent's Amended
Complaint, the Appellants asserted the following affirmative
defense:
"The contract or contracts sued upon herein
provide for penalties which should not be
enforced by this court, and which bear no
reasonable relationshiP to the out-of-pocket
expenses incurred by the plaintiff or
plaintiff's assignor."
(R. 120).
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At the time of the trial and in POINTS IV and

v

of their

brief, the Appellants contended that the 3' handling
charge imposed in connection with the repurchase of equipment
by IHC was an unconscionable and an unenforceable penalty.
In response to this contention the Respondent submits that,
(1) the handling charge in question was specifically agreed
to between the parties at the time that the dealership
commenced;

(2) actual costs incurred in connection with the

repurchase far exceeded the modest handling charge, and
(3) the evidence presented to show the actual out-of-pocket
costs was competent and was properly received.
The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Exhibit 1)
which was entered into between the parties clearly spells
out the procedure to be followed in connection with the
termination of a dealership.

Section 29 of the Agreement

provides as follows:
"Upon termination of the agreement, the
Company agrees to repurchase, and the Dealer
agrees to resell and deliver F.O.B. the
Company's District Office, or other F.O.B.
point agreed upon between the parties, all
new, current, unused and salable tractors and
machines, of the most current code announced
by the Company, and equipment and at~achments,
on hand in the Dealer's place of bus~ness
that have been delivered to the Dealer under
this and prior agreements. The prices to ~e
paid by the Company shall be the dealer pr~ces
at which they have been charged to the Dealer
(but not more than the Company's current
dealer prices) less all discounts allowed and
less a handling charge of 3 per cent.
In
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addition, the Company will make an allowance to the Dealer for freight on such
goods based on the carload freight rates
in effect on the date of termination from
the factories where the goods were produced
to the Dealer's town or the District Office,
whichever is less."
This provision of the Agreement was adhered to in every
respect.

The farm equipment was transported to the IHC

depot in Clearfield, Utah (R. 264) and full credit was
given to the dealer for the cost of the equipment plus the
freight charges paid by the dealer in connection with its
purchase of the equipment (R. 264, 265).

The only deduc-

tion was the disputed 3% handling charge.
Noel R. Critchfield, the area manager for IHC,
supervised the repurchase of the equipment.

He testified

that approximately $306,000 worth of inventory was repurchased by IHC from Pioneer pursuant to the Dealer Sales and
Service Agreement (R. 264).

Applying the 3% handling

charge to the inventory which was repurchased resulted in
total handling charges of approximately $9,180.

Anticipati~

the argument that these charges constituted an unenforceable
penalty, the Respondent presented evidence showing some of
the actual expenses incurred by IHC in connection with the
repurchase of the equipment, including:
$2,000.00 - Itemized out-of-pocket expenses of
IHC employees involved in handling
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the return of the equipment,
including transportation, food and
lodging (R. 267, 235, 236).
$13,800.00- Cost to IHC of providing new credit
te~s

to dealers purchasing the

equipment.

An interest free period

of at least six months is provided
to dealers and the cost to IHC
would be not less than $13,800.00
(R.

270-273).

$2,300.00 - Service fee incurred by IHC in
connection with the resale of the
equipment pursuant to regular wholesale flooring arrangements (R. 273274).
$18,100.00- TOTAL
In addition, there was testimony that substantial
additional costs were incurred, including long distance
telephone charges (R. 268, 269) and the wages of the people
involved (R. 236, 237).

Plaintiff's evidence clearly

showed that the actual costs involved in connection with
the repurchase of the inventory far exceeded the handling
charge in question.
The costs listed above were incurred by IHC,
-25-
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the party repurchasing the equipment and imposing the
handling charge.

The terms of the repurchase were settled

by the Agreement (Exhibit 1) between Pioneer and IHC.
The only concern of Respondent IHCC with this process was
to see that it occurred and that funds were generated
thereby to apply to the substantial amount owing to it
by Pioneer.

The net amount resulting from the repurchase

by IHC was applied to the Pioneer account.
Since the disputed handling charge was imposed
by IHC and the Appellants have not taken issue on appeal with
the dismissal of their Third-Party Complaint against IHC,
the issue really has no place in this appeal which involves
only the claim of IHCC.
Nevertheless, a brief additional discussion of
several additional points may be in order.

First, the

Appellants have argued that the evidentiary support for the
costs incurred by IHC was inadequate.

The primary witness

presenting testimony on the matter was Noel R. Critchfield.
Mr. Critchfield is the area manager for IHC (R. 256) and,
as such, he supervised and had direct responsibility for
the repurchase and the eventual resale of the equipment whic
was purchased from Pioneer, and the costs connected therewith.

No other person had more direct, first hand

of these facts than Mr. Critchfield.
-26-

knowled~

Rule 19 of the Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
"As a prerequisite for the testimony of
a witness on a relevant or material matter,
there must be evidence that he has personal
knowledge thereof, or experience, training
or education if such be required.•
Secondr the actual costs shown by the evidence
are sufficient in amount as to eliminate any argument that
the handling charge constituted a penalty.

The pertinent

cases only require that the out-of-pocket costs bear some
reasonable relationship to the amount of the agreed
charge:
(1) Perkins v. Spencer, 112 Utah 468, 243 P.2d
446 (1952) - the contractual charge will not
be enforced where it is "unconscionable and
exorbitant • . • bearing no relationship
to the actual damages suffered."
(2) Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 (Utah, 1977) enforcement denied where the liquidated
damages are "

grossly excessive and

disproportionate to any possible loss."
The undisputed evidence in this case clearly
demonstrated that IHC incurred costs far in excess of the
handling charge imposed in connection with the repurchase of
equipment from the Pioneer inventory.

Even if the Appellants'

dispute was with IHC, they would have no basis for com-27-
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plaining about the small handling charge.

The Respondent,

IHCC, did not impose the charge in question and the question
of whether it was justified has no place in an appeal of
its judgment.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
A BELATED AMENDMENT OF THE PLEADINGS,
PARTICULARLY SINCE THE EVIDENCE RELATING
TO THE NEW THEORY WAS UNCLEAR AND UNCONVINCING
In POINT VI of their Brief, the Appellants contend
that the Trial Court should have permitted an amendment of
the pleadings to conform to the evidence.

Specifically,

the Appellants contend that Exhibit No. 25 was shown during
the trial to have been accepted by the parties as a valid
agreement reflecting the liability of the Appellants to
the Respondent.

This contention is completely lacking in

merit for a number of reasons.
First, before an amendment to conform to the
evidence is proper under Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the issue not raised by the pleadings must
have been, " . . . tried by express or implied consent of
the parties

When the Appellants made their motion

to amend at the close of the trial (R. 551) , counsel for
the Respondent stated as fellows:
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"Mr. Pugsley: I'd strenuously object, your
Honor, I think that's a whole new theory of
the case. It comes as a complete news to us
that they intended to assert such a theory.
I think it's absolutely improper to bring it
in at this point."
(R. 552)
Thus, there clearly was no consent to including the
affirmative defense of "novation" as an issue in the case.
Rule B(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
requires that such affirmative defenses be pleaded.

Where

they are not and where, as here, the opposing party does
not consent to the trial of the issue or to the amendment
and asserts both surprise and prejudice in meeting the new
issue, it is proper for the Trial Court to deny the motion
to amend.
In the case of National Farmers Union Property
and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249
(1955), the Court upheld a ruling denying a party the right
to rely on an issue not raised in the pleadings where there
was no consent to try the issue.

In doing so the Court

stated that,
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to
eliminate technicalities and liberalize
procedure, we must not lose sight of the
cardinal principle that under our system
of justice, if an issue is to be tried
and a party's rights concluded with
respect thereto, he must have not~ce
thereof and an opportunity to meet it."

-29-
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This lanquaqe has been cited and relied upon by the Court
on various occasions since the date of the National Farmers
~

case (see e.g. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d

226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957)).
In one of the most recent decisions on the issue
of a proposed amendment to conform to the evidence, Meyer
v. Deluke, 123 Utah 2d 74, 457 P.2d 966 (1969), the Court
upheld a ruling of the trial court denying a motion to
amend on the ground that the defendants had known the facts
at the time that they filed their answer but had failed to
assert the affirmative defense.

Under those facts the trial

court was held to have discretion in denying the motion to
amend and its decision to do so was upheld.
In the instant case it was particularly appropriate
for the motion to amend to be denied since the evidence
with respect to the exhibit in question was confusing and
conflicting and the exhibit does not on its face reflect a
new agreement or a waiver of anything.
In their brief the Appellants contend that
Exhibit 25 constitutes a novation and a waiver of the 3%
handling charge.
any such thing.

There was no evidence that it represented
Defendant Wayne Schoenfeld testified

that Exhibit 25 was prepared during a meeting with
representatives of the IHC and IHCC and that the result
-30-
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of the calculations was an agreed obligation to the Respondent
of approximately $44,000 (R. 506, 507).
more than the Respondent is claiming.

This is substantially
The second large

page of Exhibit 25 was, according to Mr. Schoenfeld, prepared and executed for the purpose of securing the $44,000
obligation which was agreed upon (R. 507).

It is remarkable

that the Appellants contend that a document reflecting a
$44,000 obligation (more than the Respondent's Judgment) was
a novation, or a new contractual obligation which was
substituted for an old one.

There was no testimony with

respect to payments thereon or a reduction of the obligation
and, if Exhibit 25 was in fact a novation, the only alternative for the Trial Court would have been to have entered
judgment in favor of the Respondent in the amount of
$44,000.
The testimony of Mr. Homestead on cross-examination
with respect to the meeting with Mr. Schoenfeld or another
one shortly thereafter was that the parties could not agree
on the amount owing and that Mr. Schoenfeld disagreed with
a number of the items that the Respondent was claiming.
(R.

219, 220).

Thus, the record with respect to Exhibit 25 was
not clear.

If it did represent a novation, the agreed

obligation was well in excess of the amount claimed by the
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Respondent in this suit.

Under these circumstances, and

particularly in view of the Respondent's strong objection
to the proposed amendment to conform to the evidence, the
Trial Court was clearly justified in refusing to permit
the Appellants to rely on a new and novel theory which
they had not pled and which the evidence did not support.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
INCLUDING AS PART OF THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED HEREIN INTEREST IN THE
AMOUNT OF $5,291.09
The Trial Court found (R. 23) that interest on
the principal amount of the claim in the amount of $5,291.09
was supported by the evidence and the agreements entered
into between the parties, and included this amount as part
of the Judgment (R. 20) •
The Respondent's claim to interest was based
upon the provisions of the Schedule of Discounts and Terms
which is a part of Exhibit 1.

Page 4 of the Schedule

includes the following language:
"Interest owed on floor plan obligations
will be assessed and due monthly.
Before
and after-maturity rates for the ensuing
month will be determined in relation to the
prime rate in effect at four of seven
specified New York City banks on the third
Monday of the current month.
The beforematurity rate will be one and one-half
(1 l/2) percent and the aftec-maturity rate
will be three and one-half (3 l/2) percent
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over the prime rate. The ~n~ rates
established by the Company are eight (8)
percent before maturity and ten (10)
percent after maturity. If the interest
rates determined as set forth herein
exceed rates permitted by law, then the
highest rates permitted by law shall apply.
The after-maturity rate determined by the
preceding paragraph shall apply for calculating interest due on open-account obligations not paid at maturity.•
The Respondent's principal witness, Delbert L.
Homestead, testified with respect to the calculation of
interest based upon the language of the Agreement.

His

testimony (R. 216, 217) was that the interest had been
calculated on the basis of 3 1/2% over the prime rate,
that the dealer had been advised monthly of the interest rate
that applied for that month and

tha~

applying the applicable

interest rates for the period in question to the principal
amount of the obligation of the Appellants, interest in the
amount of $5,291.09 was due.

Appellants' counsel failed

to cross-examine with respect to this testimony and no evidence was offered tending to call into question the way
that the interest was calculated or the amount of the interest
due.
It is remarkable that the Appellants contend that
the interest rate to be applied to the open account obligation was not specified.

The language of the Agreement

which is quoted above specifically applies the interest rate
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used by Mr. Homestead to n . • • open-account obligations
not paid at maturity.n
In view of the fact that the written agreement
between the parties expressly provides for interest and the
interest calculation of the only witness who testified
with respect to the matter was made in specific compliance
with the contractual provision, there is simply no basis
for the Appellants to complain about this part of the
Judgment.

The dates when the obligations became due on the

flooring financing and the open account were covered by the
testimony of Mr. Homestead (R. 181, 182).
Having established the dates when the obligations
became due, the rate of interest agreed to between the
parties and the principal amount to which the interest
applied, the calculation of the amount of interest due was
a simple matter and, as indicated above, the testimony of
Mr. Homestead thereon was neither challenged through crossexamination nor called into question by any contrary
evidence.

The interest could be and it was calculated

with certainty and it thus satisfied the cases cited by
the Appellants, including Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co.,
32 Utah 101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907), Anderson v. State Farm
Fire and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101 (Utah, 1978) and
Uintah Pipeline Corporation v. White Superior Company, 546
P.2d 885

(Utah, 1976).
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In view of the Appellants' attempt to avoid the
payment of interest which was specifically agreed to by
contract, the following language from the case of Farnsworth
v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571 (1950) seems appropriate
for consideration:
"Conventional interest in the ordinary
acceptation of the term is such interest
as the parties to a contract have agreed
upon as part of their contract, and is
as much an integral part of the debt as
the principal itself: and while it forms
an element in computing the amount of
recovery, it does so in the way that a
provision of the contract limiting liability,
or any other contractual provision as to
the amount involved in the contract, does•.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN STRIKING THE APPELLANTS' DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL AND IN PROCEEDING TO HEAR AND
DECIDE THE MATTER WITHOUT A JURY
POINT VIII of the Appellants' Brief contends at
the start that it was error for the Trial Court to deny them
a trial by jury.

In the discussion of the matter, however,

the Appellants concede that the case had "equitable aspects"
a jury could have acted in an advisory

and that "
capacity

.
The Appellants filed a Request for Jury Trial on

May 24, 1978 (R. 106).

On June 19, 1978 the Respondent

filed a Motion to Strike (R. 94) and a Memorandum in Support
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(R. 95).

Contrary to Rule 2.8{b) of the Rules of Practice

in the District Courts, the Appellants failed to file
answering points and authorities and, on August 21, 1978,
the Motion was granted {R. 65).
Rule 38{a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that,
"The right of trial by jury as declared by
the Constitution or as given by statute
shall be prese.!"ved to the parties."
Thus, the right to a jury trial must be predicated upon a
constitutional provision or a statute.

Article I Section 10

of the Constitution of Utah provides as follows:
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate.
In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts
of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist
of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous.
In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A
jury, in civil cases, shall be waived unless
demanded."
While this provision recognizes that there are civil actions
in which a jury may be demanded, it does not by its terms
guarantee a jury trial, as a matter of right, in civil
actions.
cases".

That right remains "inviolate" only in "capital
Therefore, the right to a jury trial in civil

cases is neither an absolute matter of right nor is it
conferred by the Constitution.

Since the language of the

Utah jury trial provision does net specifically require a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-36Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

right to jury trial, the requirement should not be created
by implication.

See, Degnan, Right to Civil Trial in Utaha

Constitution and Statute, 8 Utah L. Rev. 97, 121-22 (1962).
The other basis for a jury trial provided for in
Rule 38(a) is "by statute".

Utah Code Annotated 578-21-1

(1953) provides:
"In actions for the recovery of specific
real or personal property, with or without
damages, or for money claimed as due upon
contract or as damages for breach of contract,
or for injuries, an issue of fact ma~ be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial is wa1ved or a
reference is ordered. [Emphasis added.]
By its terms, the statute is permissive rather than mandatory
because it states that certain types of action •may be
tried by a jury" and not that they must be as a matter of
right.
Under the pertinent decisions of this Court, the
matter of whether a jury trial is appropriate depends on
the nature of the primary issues involved in the case.
The clearest statement of the fundamental rule in Utah is as
follows:
"If the issues are legal or the major issue
legal, either party is entitled upon proper
demand to a jury trial; but, if the issues
are equitable or the major issues to be
resolved by an application of equity, the
legal issues being merely subsid~ary, the
action should be regarded as equ1table and
the rules of equity apply."
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Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension Soc.,
84 Utah 514, 37 P.2d 339 (1934).

The court reaffirmed

this rule in Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250
(1958).
The issues in the instant case are such that the
defendants were not entitled to a jury trial.

The action

was initiated for the purpose of recovering a deficiency
following an agreed procedure which in essence was a
foreclosure.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that actions

for
"the foreclosure of mortgages . . . were
historically and traditionally equitable
n

Petty v. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 129 P.2d 568, 572 (1942).
In that same case, the court said:
"The cases in Utah are definite. They
explicitly hold that in a foreclosure
suit on a note and a mortgage the issue
of indebtedness is not triable by a jury
as a matter of right." Id. at 574.
In Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. v. Kay, Bl Utah 595,
21 P.2d 836

(1933), a case which is markedly similar to the

instant suit, the court held:
"Under statutes such as we have and as
generally obtain in other jurisdictions,
a necessary part or basis of a mortgage
is a debt or other obligation to secure
the payment or performance of which the
mortgage is given.
When the debt or
obligation is denied, proof thereof lS
essential to the right of foreclosure,
-38-
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and, if the debt or other obliqation
falls, the mortqaqe falls. Here the
mortqage was given to secure the payment
of what then remained due and unpaid on
the co~tract of purchase of the machinery,
~ount~ng to $1,183.
By the complaint it
~s alleged that thereafter there was paid
on the indebtedness $243, leaving a balance
due and unpaid in the sum of $963. That
balance so remaining due and unpaid was
denied. It also is denied that the mortqaqe
was given for a good consideration, and it
was alleged that it was given without
consideration. All that related to the
right of foreclosure itself. Though the
pleaded affirmative defenses in character
were legal, yet they no more prevented or
relieved the court from determining the whole
issue than if the defendant had pleaded
payment or non est factum. Because as to
the pleaded defenses the burden of proof was
cast on the defendants, again no more
relieved the court from the duty and responsibility of determing the whole issue than if
a plea of payment or of confession and avoidance had been interposed. We therefore are
of the opinion that no error was comm~tted in
the court's ruling dismissing the jury and
in determinin the whole issue resented b
the plead~ngs." [Emphas~s added.
Despite the fact that the Consolidated Wagon case
preceded the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code in Utah,
it is still applicable.

While the present suit is based

upon a security agreement, the term "security agreement" is
nothing more than a new term under the Uniform Commercial
Code to cover a variety of older interests, the chattel
mortgage being among them.
(2)

(See, Utah Code Annotated 70A-9-102

(1953)).
-39-
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Finally, in State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565
P.2d 413 (Utah, 1977) the court held that "the trial court
did not err in ruling defendants were not entitled to a
jury trial • • • " in an action to foreclose a security
interest in both real and personal property.

The court

once again noted that the action was equitable.
It was clearly within the discretion of the Trial
Court to deny the Appellants' request for a jury trial
(Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d
126 (1966)).

Both the Respondent's claim and the Appellants'

defenses were essentially equitable in character and, under
those circumstances, the Court's decision to hear and
decide the case without the aid of a jury was justified
and should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
This rather complicated case was presented to the
Trial Court over a period of several days.

Extensive

testimony and numerous exhibits were presented in evidence.
The Trial Court had the benefit of memoranda from both
sides covering a number of legal and factual issues.

The

record on appeal does not contain and the Appellants'
Brief fails to point out any legally sufficient basis for
overturning any of the findings and conclusions made by the
Trial Court or for granting a new trial.
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The decision which was entered was supported by
the evidence and the law and the Judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
International Harvester Credit
corporat1on
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